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PAULA. LeBEL 
Contributory Negligence and Mitigation 
of Damages: Comparative Negligence 
Through the Back Door? 
A comparative negligence bill I of general applica· 
hility is currently pending before the General Assem-
hly. Passed by the House and carried over by the 
Senate, the bill has, not surprisingly, elicited both 
praise and condemnation. While attention has been 
focused on the proposed legislative changes in the 
effect of a plaintiffs contributory negligence, the 
Supreme Court of Virginia issued an opinion, Law-
rence v. Wirth, ~ that could represent a significant ero· 
sion of the contributory negligence rule. This article 
first examines the Supreme Court's distorted and 
totally unnecessary treatment of contributory negli-
gence in Lawrpncp. The article then explores the 
Court's use of the concept of mitigation of damages to 
accomplish many of the aims of the com parative neg-
ligence doctrine. 
Lawrence v. Wirth: Revising 
Contributory Negligence 
The Supreme Court's disposition of the contribu-
tory negligence issue in Lawrence could, if extended 
to other cases, substantially narrow the scope of 
operation of the contributory negligence rule. Fur-
thermore, as will be demonstrated, the Court did not 
need to reinterpret the rule in order to permit recovery 
by the plaintiff. The sequence of events as recounted 
by the Court l is important for an understanding of 
what the Court decided and for an appreciation of the 
alternative ground the Court could have employed to 
reach the same result. The following narrative has 
been written in such a way as to highlight the critical 
facts. 
Plaintiff discovered a lump on her breast in June. 
She consulted a physician who referred her to the 
defendant after the physician was unsuccessful in 
aspirating th e lump. The defendant did not detect the 
lump, but he was concerned about a different mass he 
discovered, and performed a partial mastectomy in 
August. Immediately after the surgery and again a 
week la ter when the sutures were removed, plaintiff 
called the defendant's attention to the original lump. 
Although the defendant expressed no concern about 
those reports, he did advise her to obtain medical 
attention if she had further problems or detected sub-
sequent changes. In October, the plaintiff noticed 
that the lump had grown larger, but she delayed seek-
ing medical attention until December, at which time 
another surgeon performed a total mastectomy. A 
year later, she was diagnosed as having terminal 
metastatic bone cancer. Her oncologist identified the 
August-December interval between surgical proce-
dures as the period when the cancer metastasized. 
The trial court sent the case to the jury with instruc· 
tions that included contributory negligence. The 
judgment entered on the verdict for the defendant 
was set aside by the Supreme Court, holding that the 
contributory negligence defense was not available in 
these circumstances. 
The Court based its holding on what was described 
as "a well-established principle of tort law that, to har 
recovery, a plaintiffs negligence must concur with 
the defendant's. ~ The authority cited for that princi-
ple provides only the most tenuous support for the 
proposition.-" While it is true that the cited case uses 
the word "concurring," the factual setting of the case 
and the context in which the word is used make it 
clear that the authority will simply not hear the 
burden of supporting the Court's use of the principle. 
In a recent study of Lon Fuller's work in legal philos-
ophy, Fuller's views on interpreting and applying 
precedent are said to include the idea that "a judge is 
not to seize on words and phrases in an opinion, 
abstract them from their context, and apply them 
more or less in accord with some assumed literal 
meaning that they might be thought to have. liB An 
examination of other Supreme Court decisions on 
contributory negligence reveals that the Court in 
[.atvrence has acted contrary to Fuller's notion of the 
proper use of precedent, and has invested the idea of 
plaintiffs and defendant's concurring negligence 
with a new meaning. 
Two cases decided in the last ten years provide a 
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dramatic contrast with the "well-established principle 
of tort law" that the Supreme Court relied on in LaiC-
ren('e. In Reliah/r Stores Curporation v. Marsh. ' the 
Supreme Court reversed a judgment for a plaintiff 
who walked into a closed glass door marked with a 
decal at approximately plaintiffs eye level. Entering 
judgment for the defendant, the Court held that, as a 
matter of law, plaintiff was negligent and her negli-
j.{encp was a proximate cause uf the injury. The Court 
similarly approved keeping a contributury negligence 
illllue from the jury in Reed v. Carlyle & Ma rtin. Tnc., ' 
in which the Court affirmed a summary judgment for 
the defendants. The plaintiff was held to be cuntribu-
torily negligent as a matter of law when he stood on 
top of a load of silage while pitch forking the silage 
into the moving beaters of a piece of equipment that 
hnd been manufactured, repaired, and sold by the 
various defendants. In neither of those cases is it 
proper to say that the negligent conduct of the plain-
tiff was precisely concurrent with negligent conduct 
of the defendant, if, as the Lau'reflce opinion sug-
gests, concurrent conduct is interpreted tu mean con-
temporaneous events. The product liability defend-
ants in Reed acted well before plaintiff climhed into 
the silaj.{e, and the employees of the jewelry store in 
Reliable Storrs had completed their actions \vi th 
respect to the glass door priur to plaintiffs collision 
with it. If, on the other hand, concurrent conduct can 
be said to exist in Rrliable Stores and Reed in a con-
tinuing negligence sense that plaintiffs' conduct 
occurn-'d while the effects of defendants' wrongful 
conduct w('re still in uperation, then a fair reading of 
the fa tcrellce facts would prod uce the same concl u-
sion that was reached in the two earlier cases. ,Just as 
the product ddendants in Recd created a condition in 
which plaintiffs conduct became dang-erous, the sur-
geon's conduct in Lalcrenc(' created a condition in 
which plaintiffs delay' in seeking medical attention 
after detecting the enlarg-ed lump proved to he 
dangerous. 
/,([Il ' rl'flC(, thus either reprpspnts a distorted view of 
concurring plaintiff and defendant negligence, or it is 
a radical departure from prior applications of the con-
tri butory nej.{ligence doctri ne-a departure th at su b-
stantially limits the availability of the doctrine. 
Tested aganist /,all'rence standards, neither of the 
plaintiffs in thl' two cases used for illustration would 
be barred from recovery by the contributury negh-
gpnce dpfensp, because neithN plaintiffs conduct 
precisely concurred with thl! negligent. conduct of till' 
rpspectivp deppndants. 
The rcsult-oripnted decision in /,([ICI"{'Tl('P fits into a 
broadl'r pattern of appellatp court tn'atnwnt. of plain-
tilTs fault dl'fl'llses. T() the ext.m1t that plaintiffs fnult 
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issups are deemed to be questions of fact.. appellate 
courts must be wi II inj.{ to live with the results reached 
by the factfinders,' 1 ur the courts must tinker with the 
legal rules so that the issues ca n be rpsol ved as mat-
ters of law. Viewed from this pt'rspl'ctive, Rdiahl(' 
St(}res and /,Gl.el"{'/I('(' arp oppositP siell's of tlw same 
coin: in each case, the factfinders' ('haracterization of 
t.he plaintiffs conduct was rejecte<i hy the Supreme 
Court. 
The most surprising feature uf t.he Supreme ('ourt's 
decision in Lall'fI'1H'(' is thp Court's distortion of the 
contributory negligl'ncp doct.rinp whl'n there existRd a 
way of reaching the same rpsult t.hrough a perfectly 
Ipgitimate application of l'UlTPnt d()ctrine. In order to 
constitute the affirmativl' ell'fl'nsL' of ('ontl;butory 
neg-ligence, plaintiffs conduct mu><t meet two require-
ments: it must be (a) unreasonable i " and (h) a proxi-
mate cause of the plaintiffs injur.v. ii Wlwthpr plain-
tiffs conduct was unn'asonahlp is a qupstion as to 
...... hich there can be a ieg-itimatp di fference of opinion. 
As noted earlier, treating such matters as qupstions 
of fact requires courts to lw satisfied with thp result 
the factfinders reach. While 1 have littl(~ trouble decid-
ing til(' plaintiffs rpliance on the defendant's appar-
ent. Io.ck of concern when she inquireci about thl' orig-
inal lump ,vas a reasonable response to her October 
discovery that the lump had grown, I also recognize 
that the plaintiffs testim()n:-.' about her fear of 
cancer :C! cuuld lead a factfinder to ('onclude that 
plaintiffs dplay was hoth unrl'as()nahlp :-Inc! a direct 
vioio.tion of the dpfpndant..'s advice to sppk further 
attpntion if she noticpd a change in her ('on<iition. 
Whatever onp-s vipw about the rpasonahleness of 
plaintiffs conduct, the simple fact is thnt. thl' issue is 
not one that should pver he suhmittpd to the fact-
finder. The second rpquirernent uf contrihutory' negli-
gem,(,-the causation element-calls for a de('ision of 
that issue fur the plaintiffin LalNf'II('/, as a matter of 
law. The evidence relied on by the Supreme Court 
indicated that metastasis occurrf:'d sometime' hetween 
the surgical procedures Iwrformed in August and 
Decem ber. 1.1 Focusing- on the October discovpry' of the 
enlarged lump as the first date on which plaint.iffs 
conduct could lw consid('f('d unreasonahlp, and as-
suming that her subsequent dela.v in seeking medical 
advice was unreasonahle, giv('s t.he ('ourt two rele-
vant periods of timl': (a) August -(ktolwr, when plain-
tiffs conduct was not unreasonable, ' I and (11) Octo-
ber-De(,pmher, when it was (assumed to be) unreason-
ublp. For plaintiffs unreasonabll' conduct to have 
hl'l"n a CHuse of Iwr injury' . t.hen, metastasis must 
have occurred during tlw latter ppri()d. Kl'cause con-
trihutor:-.' negligpncf:' is an affirmat.ive dpfense, t.he 
hurdl'n is on til(' defendant. t.o ('swblish each of the 
elements of the defenseI-' Having given the defend-
ant the lwne!it of the doubt on the characterization of 
plaintiffs conduct as unreasonable, it is nevertheless 
dear that defendant cannot satisfy his burden of 
proof on the causation element. The prohahility that 
metastasis occurred in the October-December period 
is at best p(jually as great as that it occurred during 
the August-Octoher period . Given the equally proba· 
ble infcrf'ncE:'s to he drawn from the evidence, the 
defendant, as the party with the burden of proof on 
the contrihutory negligence defense, must be found to 
have failed to satisfy that burden as a matter of law. 
Given this state of the evidence. it would be en-or to 
submit thp contributory negligence issue to a jury. 
While plaintiffs conduct might be considered negli-
gent. that npgligpncp was, as a mattBr of law, not a 
legal CaUHl' of the plaintiffs harm. 
My analysiH of contributory negligence in Lall'-
rell('e reHches the same result that was obtained by 
thE:' Supreme Court: the jury may not bar plaintiffs 
recoypry by applying the defense of contrihutory neg· 
ligence. The Court reaches that result hy deciding 
that the defense does not apply to the facts of the case. 
My analysis. on the other hand. finds that the defense 
does apply to the faelH, but concludes that the defend-
ant cannot sustain hiH hurden of proof on the causa-
tion element of thl' defense. The difference between 
theHe two approaches is not trivial. The analysis 
offered in this article is, unlike that used by the Court, 
consistent with prior rulings on contributory negli-
gence. The Court's approach hints at a new view of 
contributory negligence that will make the defense 
unavailahll' in a widp range of cases where it pre· 
viously applil'd. 
Mitigation of Damages and Comparative Fault 
After holding that contributory negligence was not 
applicablp to the facts of Lawren('e v. Wirth. the 
Supreme Court then held that the plaintiffs conduct, 
if unreasonablE:'. ('ould be considered by the jury in 
mitigation of damages. I ii The remainder of this arti-
ell' will focus on the similarity between this use of 
mitigation of damagps and a general doctrine of 
comparativp negligence. 
Viewing till' Court's application of mitigation of 
damages as a thinly disguised form of comparative 
negligencl' requires no great leap of imagination. 
Virginia 's railroad-crossing accident statute ,17 ac· 
knowledged to be a comparative negligence provi· 
sion . ;k is worded in terms of mitigation of damages. If 
the Court's use of mitigation of damages in l,aU 'N'lIce 
were to be widely applil'd. the result would be that the 
Court would havl' adopted by common law a measure 
that iH closer to pure comparative negligence, and 
II 
Paul A. LeBel is Associate Professor of l.aw at 
Marshall -Wythe School of Law. College of Wil-
liam and Mary, where he teaches Torts, Prod-
ucts Liability, and JurisprudencE'. He received 
his A.B. degree from George Washington Uni-
versity and his J.D. from the University of Flor· 
ida . Prior to joining the faculty of William and 
Mary in 19H2. he taught for four years at the 
University of Alabama. Professor LeHel wishes 
to thank Professor John Donaldson for calling 
the /.all'rI'I1CI' cal;e to his attention . 
thus more favorable to tort plaintiffs , than the ver-
sion of comparative negligence now pending before 
the state legislature. 
The comparative negligence hill approved by the 
House is a "51 '7<, bar" provision . I!! Plaintiffs recovery 
is reduced hy the proportion of plaintilrs negligence 
as long as plaintiffs negligence does not exceed 50%. 
If plaintiffs negligence is greater than that of the 
other parties?) i.e., ;'il '!';, or more, the contributory neg· 
ligence rule reenters the case and operates as a total 
bar to plaintiffs recovery. The Court's UHe of the mit-
igation of damages defense in Lawrence seems to 
leave open the possihility that a plaintiffs unreason-
able failure to mitigate damages could he held 
responsible for f)I 'V" or more of the damages plaintiff 
suffered , allowing plaintiff to recover less than ;')0'7<, of 
those damages. However. if the unreasonable failure 
to mitigate wefe deemed to be negligE'nce on the part 
of the plaintiff, then assigning responsibility for 51% 
or more of the damages to plaintiffs conduct would 
result in no recovery for the plaintiff under the type of 
comparative negligence statute currently being con-
sidered by the legislature. 
The Supreme Court of Virginia may well under-
stand the difference between unreasonable conduct 
that is negligent and unreasonable conduct that fails 
to mitigate damages. Similarly, if the comparative 
negligence statute should be enacted in its present 
form, the Court may also have occasion to point out 
the difference between unreasonable conduct that 
fails to reach the recovery-barring threshold of a 51')'1, 
bar comparative negligence statute and unreasonable 
conduct that fails to mitigate, and thus eliminates 
recovery of, some proportion from 5PYil to 99 lPh of plain-
tiffs damages.~l I do not mean in any way to suggest 
that those differences do not exist, or that the Court is 
being specious or disingenuous if it says it recognizes 
them. Rut the application of th'ese concepts is nor-
mally going to be turned over to a factfinder unfamil-
iar with, and untrained in making, such fine distinc-
tions. Whether or not the Supreme Court purposely 
blurs the boundary line between contributory or com-
parative negligence and mitigation of damages, a 
common sense appraisal of what jurors are capable of 
doing suggest.s that such blurring is an inevitable 
result of turning such matters over to juries. 
The discussion so far has assumed that the Court's 
use of a mitigation of damages defense was appro-
priate in Lawrence. and that the problematic aspect 
of such use concerns its likely slippage into a more 
general practice of comparative fault decisionmaking 
disguised as something else. But an examination of 
the Lawrence case suggests that the Court is replac-
ing a recovery-barring contrihutory negligence defense 
with a recovery-limiting defense in a situation where 
use of the latter kind of defense is inappropriate. A 
review of the leading treatises indicates that the pre-
ferred lahel to attach to the defense that the Court 
uses is "avoidable consequences" rather than "mit-
ig-ation of damages."~~ The avoidable consequences 
rule prevents a plaintiff from recovering damages for 
a harm that could have heen avoided had the plaintiff 
acted reasonahly after the commission of the tort. ~:I 
There are a number of technical legal arguments why 
this rule docs not apply to the facts of Lau'rcl1cc. 
The avoidable consequences rule is concerned with 
what a plaintiff could have done "after the commis-
sion of the tort."~ l The event descrihed hy that last 
phrase needs to be distinguished from a different 
even t. tl1P defendant's .... vrongful conduct. rf the avoid-
ahle consequences rule was framed in terms of plain-
tiffs conduct after the defendant\; wrongful conduct, 
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then a case might be mad!> for applying the rule to 
Mrs. Lawrence, because her delay in seeking' medical 
attention did occur after the defendant's conduct. 
Rut the commission of a tort is not complete upon 
defendant's conduct. At least when the action is 
based on a negligence theory of liability, the tort is 
not complete until the defendant's breach of a duty of 
care owed to the plaintiff has proximately caused 
some legally cognizable harm to the plaintiff. Thus, 
until plaintiff suffers harm, there has been no tort of 
negligence, even though it might be possible to char-
acterize the defimdant's conduct as negligent.2s In the 
Lawrence situation, the harm produced by the defen-
dant's conduct would be the worsening of plaintiffs 
condition, i.e., metastasis. It is only upon metastasis 
that the defendant's tort has heen committed. Hecause 
the exact date of metastasis cannot be determined, 
any conclusion that plaintiff's delay in obtaining 
medical attention occurred after the commission of 
the tort would be pure speculation. The Lawr(,l1c(' 
situation, given the set of facts described by the 
Supreme Court, does not satisfy the terms of the 
avoidable consequences rule. 
Prosser offers a different explanation of the avoid-
able consequences rule. but even under his version, 
the rule would not be properly applied to the l,aU'· 
renee case. Prosser suggests that the avoidable con-
sequences rule is triggered only when it is feasihle to 
assign damages to the separate negligence of defend-
ant and plaintifPH When such a division of damages 
is not possible, the appropriate defense is contribu-
tory negligence, not avoidable ('onsequences.~ ~ A con-
sideration of alternati ve assumptions demonstrates 
that Prosser's method of applying the avoidable con· 
sequences rule ought not to lead to the result reached 
by the Court in Lawrpnc('. Assllmp first that metasta-
sis occurred prior to October. In that case, the dam-
ag-es from plaintiffs terminal illness are incapable of 
apportionment between defendant's conduct and plain-
tiffs conduct. Death is. as Prosser puts it. a "single 
indi visible result ... incapable of any reasonable or 
practical division. "~~ The assumption that metastasis 
occurred between October and December does bring 
Prosser's version of the avoidable consequences rule 
into play. If the evidence supported that hypothesis. a 
factfinder could conclude that metastasis was avoid· 
able hy the plaintiffs prompt consultation \',~th 
another physician who would arrange for surgery to 
remove the tumor before metastasis. In this effective 
treatment scenario, those damages attributable to 
metastasis could be deemed avoidable. with the 
defendant heing held responsible only for :"llch dam-
ages as might be connected with tlw necessity to per-
form a second mastectomy on the plaintiff. However. 
just as was the casp under the contributory negliJ;{ence 
defense /~' any choice between the competing assump-
tions about when metastasis occurred would be arhi-
trary. As with contributory negligence, the defendant, 
as the party who bears the burden of proving that 
damages were avoidahle,'11l must have the issue 
decided against him as a matter of law in this situa-
tion where the competing assumptions are equally 
prohahle. 
Conclusion 
This article has focused on the technical flaws In 
the Supreme Court's consideration of defenses based 
on the plaintiffs conduct in Lawrenc(' v. Wirth. As 
demonstrated above, the facts relied on by the Court 
do not call for the submission of plaintiffs conduct 
defenses to the jury. The significance of the Court's 
decision , however, extends beyond the doctrinal criti-
cism of the Court's treatment of contributory negli-
gence and mitigation of damages. 
When dealing with a basis of liability such as neg-
ligence, in which community attitudes about proper 
conduct and appropriate compensation are legiti-
mately expressed through a jury's setting and apply-
inJ;{ a J;{eneral standard of reasonahle care, appellate 
courts have a special ohligation to display clarity, 
consistency and coherence. Those attributes are neces-
sary if the assignment of decisionmaking responsibil-
ity to the community representatives on the jury is 
both to work and to he seen to work. The perception of 
proper functioning may be just as important as the 
functioning itself, for without that perception, the 
legitimacy of the body of tort rules, if not of the legal 
system itself, is put in jeopardy. 
Juries should be free to allocate losses within a 
framework of legal rules that clarify rather than oh-
scure the range of the jury's prerogative and the pol-
icy implications of the competing decisions. If the 
total bar to recovery contemplated by a contributory 
neJ;{lig-ence rule is no longer consistent with the fair-
ness and efficiency goals oftort law, the proper course 
of action is for the court or the legislature to modify or 
replace the rule. 
Decisions such as Lawrence may have the pallia-
tive effect of relieving some of the tension between the 
results that a questionable rule requires and those the 
decisionmakers want. The harsh recovery-barring 
effect of the contributory negligence rule is avoided 
through a narrowing construction of its applicability, 
while the comparative features of the obvious substi-
tute rule of comparative negligence are injected into 
the decision under the cover of a mitigation of dam-
ages instruction to the jury. But that relief of tension 
may be accomplished at a substantial cost to the legal 
profession, tryinJ;{ to understand the leJ;{al rules that 
will govern a particular case, and to the public, which 
ought to perceive that acceptable results can be 
achieved because of the rules, rather than in spite of 
the rules. 
FOOTI\OTES 
I. House Hill No. 107 provides: 
He it enacted by the General Assembly uf Virginia: 
I. That the code uf Virginia is amended by adding in 
Article :1 uf Chapter :) uf Title R.O l a sectiun numbered 
R.0l·44.2 as follows : 
§R.01·44.2. Contrihutory negligence nut bar to re · 
covery.-Tn all actions brought hereafter for persunal 
injury , wrongful death or property damage, the f<let thHt 
the persun injured ur killed, or the owner of the damaged 
property ur person having contrul uver the pruperty, may 
hHve bCl'n guilty of contributory negligence shHll nut bar 
recovery, but the damages shall be diminished in propur· 
tion tu the amuunt uf negligence attribuwble to such per· 
sons. Huwever, such person shall recuver only if such per· 
son's negligence i:,; not greater than the combined negli· 
gence of <lll other parties. 
Assumption of risk may still be asserted as a defense 
where a perl"on fully underMands <l risk of harm to him~elf 
or his property caused by another's negligent conduct and 
who nevertheless voluntarily chuuses to accept th<lt risk. 
2. 226 Va. 40R, ::l09 S.E.2d :11" (l~K:\l. 
:l. /d . at 410·12, :-109 S. E.2d at :1l6·17. 
4. ld. at 412, :109 S .E.20 at :-117 (emphasis in original). 
:1. Chf'sapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. But.ier, 179 Va. 609, 20 S.E.2d 
;,16 (1942). 
n. R. Summcrs. Lon L. Fullpr lI2(19~H). 
7. 21k Va. 1005,24:1 S.K2d 210 (l97R). 
R. 2 1·1 Va. fi92, 202 S.E.2d R74, cert. delliNf. 41 ~J U.S. H.'i9 
(I n74) 
~ . .'Icc. (".g .. Stl"l 'e llS v. Ford Molor ('I) .. 220 Va. 41 ~'>. :~O~ 
S. E.2d :119 (l91'\:\), decided the same day as Lau'r{'lln'. in which 
the Court held that the ability uf reasun<lble persons to rl'ach 
different cunclusions from the evidence concerning an Hssump· 
tioo uf risk defense precluded the trial court from deciding that 
issue flS fl matttRr oflaw. See a/so VEPCO v. Willesell. 22;' Va. 
4;')9, :10:3 S.F:.2d 1\nR (\91\~i), holding that plaintiffs decedent's 
cunduct could nut be ruled cuntributury neg-ligencl' as a matter 
of law. 
10. SI'I'. e.R., Whitfipld v. Dunll, 202 Va. 172, 117 S.E.2r! :)7:\ 
(1961). 
I!. Rpliab/c Slores Corp. v. Morsh. 21H Va. 100.').1007.24:1 
S.K2d 219,221 (1971'\) 
12. S'ep 226 Va. at 411, :109 S.F:.2d at :116. 
I:l. Id. 
14. Defendant might argue that during this period plaintiff 
W<lS unreasonable in not obtaining H secund opinion. That the 
Supreme Court W<lS nut operating on that premise is apparent 
from the Court's handling of the concurrent negligence iAsue. 1 f 
a failure tu obtain <l second opiniun is to be considered negligent 
on the part of the pl<lintiff, that failure did concur, at least in 
part, with the Hlleged negligence of the defendant between the 
Rurgery and the remov<ll of the sutures. Thu~ it is not until the 
October discovery of the enlarged lump that plnintiffs conduct 
can first he considered unreasonable. 
I;l. S"" Burks v. Webb. 199 Va. 296, 99 S.E.:hl 6R:l (19!17). 
IIi. 226 Va. at 412· 1:1, :109 S.E.2d at ::I17·IH. 
17. Va. Codd 56-416 (1981) 
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IH . .'ieI'. ('./-I .. lllarf"lk & Hi. Ry. v. Gilliam. 211 Va. ;)42. 17S 
S. E.2d 499 (1971 l: Chesapeake & 0. fl.Y. v. Pulliam. I W, Va. 901-\, 
f116. ~I S.E.2d :),1, ;')1-\ (1947). Dean Wade uses this provision to 
identify Virginia a>:; a enntributory negligence Atate that has a 
statute "applying comparative negligence in a limited area." 
Wade. Camparatiup Nej{lij{enc('-Its Del'eiopmenl in (he United 
.'itatl's and Its P,,'s('nt Status in Louisiana. ·10 r ~'1. 1,. Rev. 2~)9, 
;lO6 ( 19HO). 
19. Pears()n, Apportionment "f rasses Undn ('amparatil'e 
Fuult Laws-An Analysis af the Alternatil'ps. 40 La. L. Rev. 
:3·1:l, :lfi:3 (I ~)SO 1 
20. The bill's reference to "other parties" is unnecessarily 
ambiguous. See Pearson supra note 19, at ::l55-57. See also Brad-
Ipy v. Appalachian Pou.." Cn .. 256 S.E.2d 879,885 (W.Va. 1979), 
holding that "a party is not barred from recovering damages in 
a tort action so long as his negligence or fault does not equal or 
exceed th(' combined negligen('e or fault of th" other parties 
inuolued in the accident." (emphasis added), noted in Cady, 
Alas and Alack, Modified Comparative Nef:[lif:[f'nce Comes to 
West Virginia, S2 W.Va. L. Rev. 473, 4S5 n.64 (19S0). Consider a 
J--car accident, in which Driver A is 35% negligent, R is 40% 
negligent, and C is 25% negligent. If A sues Band C, the pro-
posed statute would permit A to recover fifi% of his damages, 
despite the fact that A's negligence is greater than that of one of 
the defendants. However, suppose A is unable to obtain jurisdic-
tion over H. <lnd proceed1i to trial solely against C. If the rele· 
vant language is interpreted to mean "persons involved in the 
accident," A's recovery would not be barred, although the court 
would face the problems associated with determining the pro-
portion of fault properly attributable to a person who is not a 
party to the action. See Chamallas, Comparative Fault and 
Multipl(' p(lrty l.itij{(ltion jnl,ouisian(l: A Samplinj{ uf the Proh· 
lems. 40 La. L. Rev. ::l7::J, 389·91 (191-\0). Tf, on the other hand, the 
langauge means "parties (defendant) to the lawsuit," then A's 
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recovery would be harred. 
21. For example, a plaintiffs conduct may he ('ontrihutorily 
negligent but only equal to the negligence of the defendant, so 
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